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I Utilitarianism and Bentham's Ethical Theory
§ 1 Characteristics of Utilitarianism
What is utilitarianism? To give a perfect definition of utilitarianism is
perhaps impossible. But every theory which is classified as utilitarianism
has at least two characteristics. They are:
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Pleasure (or avoidance of pain) , or satisfaction of desire is considered
(I)
the good.
2 A conduct which maximizes pleasure or satisfaction of desire is con-
sidered a right conduct.
In this paper I will discuss Bentham's ethical theory and Welfare
Economics as typical examples of utilitarian theories, and attempt to
clarify their characteristics and faults. In § 2 I will explain the gist of
Bentham's ethical theory, and in § 3 I will point out what I perceive to
be its faults.
In § 4- § 9 the old (or Pigou's) and new Welfare Economics will be
discussed.
Lastly (in § 10- § 12) , I will give some suggestions concerning income
distribution and justifications for implementation.
§ 2 Bentham's Ethical Theory
First, we begin with a well known quotation from Bentham.
HNature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign
masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we
ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand
the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and ef-
(2)
fects, are fastend to their throne.
We must, later, investigate the relationship between pleasure and satisfaction
of desire. The relationship between them will be discussed in § 3 (1).
(2) Bentham, J. : An Introduction to the Principles of Morals andLegislation, London
1789,p. i.
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Bentham maintains two things :
1 Man seeks pleasure and avoids pain.
2　Pleasure is the only good and pain is the only evil.
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Against the first proposition man may present arguments such as ; Why
do you go to a dentist? Medical treatment of your decayed tooth does
give you great pain, doesn t it? It is not so difficult to answer these ques-
tions. We can answer that the quantity of pain resulting from the medical
treatment of my decayed tooth is less than that resulting from not going to
a dentist.
Is pleasure the only good? If so, it follows that the conduct which max-
lmizes the balance of pleasure over pain or minimizes the balance of pain
over pleasure is a right conduct. We must, therefore, carefully in-
vestigate whether pleasure is the only good [see, § 3 (2)].
A community consists of a large number of individuals. How shall we,
then, think about the quantity of the good of a community? Bentham
thinks that we can arrive at the quantity of the good of a community by
summing up the good of the members who compose it. But we must take
into consideration the fact that one's action seeking pleasure (or the good)
often conflicts with another's. We must make some coordination bet-
ween these conflicting actions. Bentham says that actions which increase
the quantity of the good of particular persons but decrease the quantity of
the good of a community must be prevented, and that legislator must carry
out this task by threatening to punish such actions.
§ 3 Faults of Bentham's Ethical Theory
(1) Usually Desire Comes First
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Bentham's proposition that man seeks pleasure (and avoids pain) is not,
strictly speaking, true. Usually desire comes first, and, if it is satisfied,
pleasure comes later. For example, when I am hungry I desire food, and
as long as my hunger persists food will give me pleasure. That is to say;
the hunger, which is a desire, comes first and the pleasure is a conse-
quence of the desire.
But this fault is not a significant challenge to utilitarianism. Because
we need only to substitute the proposition that man seeks satisfaction of
desire for the proposition that man seeks pleasure.
(2) `Desired'and `Desirable
To handle the proposition that pleasure is the only good (and pain is the
only evil) is much more difficult. We must-not infer the following:
pleasure is the only thing desired, therefore pleasure is the only thing
desirable. Because the fact that a thing is desired does not directly result
in the conclusion that the thing is desirable. Bentham does not, I think,
succeed in proving his proposition that pleasure is the only good.
Now, taking into consideration the fact that desire comes first and
pleasure later, we can formulate the problem like this : is satisfaction of
desire the good on its own account, and is it the only good? I think this
is one of the most difficult problems that the utilitariamst must answer.
Imagine a state as follows ;
1 A woman is vαy proud of the beauty of her bpdy and has a strong
desire to show others her naked body.
2 A man intensely desires to see the woman's naked body and intends to
pay a large sum of money in order to satify his desire.
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If satisfaction of desire is the good, it follows that when the woman in
question recieves money from the man m question and shows her naked
body to him, her conduct is a good conduct. But many people do not, pro-
bably, think her conduct to be a good one.
J. S. Mill made a distinction between high-grade pleasure and
low-grade pleasure. He states :
"Human beings have faculties more elevated than the animal appetites,
and when once made conscious of them, do not regard anything as hap-
(3)
piness which does not include their gratification.
"It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognise the fact,
that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than
(4
others."
"Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have ex-
perience of both give a decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of
(5)
moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more desirable pleasure."
"It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied ; better
(6)
to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.
If we acknowledge a distinction between qualities of pleasures (or
satisfactions of desires) , or if we acknowledge a distinction between the
more desirable pleasure (or satisfaction of desire) and the less desirable
pleasure (or satisfaction of desire) , doesn't the claim that pleasure (or
satisfaction of desire) is the only good collapse root and bronchi Don't we
(3) Mill, J.S. : Utilitarianism, 1861, in : Collected Works ofJohn StuartMill, Vol. X,
University of Toronto Press 1969, pp. 210-211.
(4) Mill, J. S., ibid., p.211.
(5) Mill, J. S., ibid., p.211.
(6) Mill, J.S., ibid., p.212.
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need a standard of good and evil other than pleasure (or satisfaction of
desire)? I don't know how the utilitarianist could solve this difficult pro-
blem.
In this paper I must accept a tentative and i汀esolute conclusion : satisfac-
tion of desire, including the satisfaction derived from seeing woman s nak-
ed body, is the good, but it is not certain that it is the only good.
(3) Distribution of the Good
According to Bentham, the quantity of the good of a community is
equivalent to the sum of the good of the members who compose it, and a
conduct which maximizes the quantity of the good of a community is a
right conduct. But he does not pay much attention to the way by which
the good is distributed among individuals. For example, prohibition of
theft is useful to everybody. It can safely be said that this kind of activity
will increase the quantity of the good of a community, and that it is a right
activity.
But can we conclude that an activity, which increases the quantity of the
good of a community and increases the quantity of the good of some per-
sons but decreases the quantity of the good of others, is a right activity?
For example, if a country lifts the ban on importing agricultural products,
it is likely that the quantity of the good of that country will increase, and
the quantity of the good of most people will increase, but the quantity of
the good of farmers will remarkably decrease. How should we respond to
this kind of phenomenon?
Moreover, we must ask another question: If the good is very evenly
distributed in a country, but in another country the good is very unevenly
distributed, and if the quantities of the good of both countries are
equivalent (assuming that the quantity of the good of a community equals
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the sum of the good of the members who compose it) , can we consider the
degree of goodness of both countries equivalent? Or, is it justifiable to
assume that the quantity of the good of a community equals the sum of the
good of the members who compose it?
The utilitarianist must not avoid these difficult problems. Therfore, we
begin with investigating Pigou's The Economics of Welfare.
n Pigou s The Economics of Welfare
§ 4 The National Dividend and the Condition of Maximizing It
(1) Economic Welfare and the National Dividend
Pigou discusses welfare. This welfare is nearly tantamount to satisfac-
tion of desire. To argue about total welfare is very difficult, therefore
Pigou confines his arguments to economic welfare. Although it may not
be allowed to identify economic welfare with total welfare, pointing out that
usually the effect of any cause on economic welfare is equivalent in direc-
tion to the effect on total welfare, he justifies his method of confining his
argument to economic welfare.
"When we have ascertained the effect of any cause on economic
welfare, we may, unless, of course, there is specific evidence to the con-
trary, regard this effect as probably equivalent in direction, though not in
(7)
magnitude, to the effect on total welfare.
Economic welfare means that part of total welfare which can be brought
M
directly or indirectly into relation with the measuring-rod of money.
(7) Pigou, A. C: The Economics of Welfare, Macmillan, London 1920, 4th ed.
1932, reprinted 1962, p. 20.
(8) Pigou, A. C, ibid., p. ll.
28 第14巻　第4号(経済学・経営学編)
(9)
The economic welfare of a community is defined as follows :
[the economic welfare of a community] -
[satisfactions derived from the use of the national dividend]
- [dissatisfactions involved in the making of itj
Kit,
The national dividend in the above equation is defined as follows :
[the national dividend] -
[things purchased with money income]
+[services people obtain from inhabiting houses owned by
themselves]
(2) Two Major Propositions Concerning the National Dividend
In Part I , Chapter VH and Vffl of The Economics of Welfare, two major pro-
positions which are the core of Pigou's theory are presented :
Provided the dividend accruing to the poor is not diminished, increases
in the size of the aggregate national dividend, if they occur in isolation
without anything else whatever happening, must involve increases in
(ll)
economic welfare.
2 Any cause which increases the absolute share of real income in the
hands of the poor, provided that it does not lead to a contraction in the
size of the national dividend from any point of view, will, in general, in-
(9) Pigou, A. C, ibid., p. 85.
Pigou, A. C, ibid., p. 34.
!ii) Pigou, A.C, ibid., p.82.
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crease economic welfare.
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In our world the factors, which cause the increase or decrease of the na-
tional dividend, affect the income distribution, too. But, because to argue
`the increase or decrease of the national dividend and `the change of the in-
come distribution'simultaneously is very difficult, Pigou analyzes them
separately. We begin with examining the first proposition.
(3) The Condition of Maximizing the National Dividend
Although Pigou does not explicitly insist that welfare is the good and
that the conduct which maximizes welfare is a right conduct, it is obvious
that his theory assumes so. If not so, such a thoroughgoing investigation
into the measures which increase or decrease economic welfare would not
have been done.
In Part n of The Economics of Welfare, the question of under which con-
dition the national dividend becomes a maximum is discussed. The
answer is : when the arrangement of resources that makes the values of the
marginal social net products equal in all uses is accomplished, this arrange-
(13)
merit is the one that makes the national dividend a maximum.
After this condition is clarified, the questions of what factors break this
equilibrium, and of what measures should, then, be employed, come under
discussion.
§ 5 Three Questions Concerning Income Distribution
To argue the second proposition in § 4 (2) is much more difficult than
the first.
(12) Pigou, A. C, ibid., p. 89.
(13) Pigou, A. C, ibid., p. 136.
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Bentham focuses his arguments on total pleasures of a community, and
does not pay attention to the distribution of pleasures [see, § 3 (3)]. But
Pigou argues not only about total economic welfare, but also about the
distribution of it. Concerning his proposition that any cause which in-
creases the absolute share of real income in the hands of the poor, provided that
it does not lead to a contraction in the size of the national dividend from any
point of view, will, in general, increase economic welfare, we must ask at least
three questions.
Provided the national dividend does not change, will the increase in
real income of the poor (or to make the income distirbution more even)
cause the increase in economic welfare?
2 Won't the cause, which increases the national dividend, make the in-
come distribution more uneven?
3 Won't the measure, which makes the income distribution more even,
decrease the national dividend?
Let's examine the first question. The second and third questions will
be discussed in § 6.
Pigou attempts to justify income redistribution by relying upon the con-
cept of ・law of diminishing marginal utility.'He says that if a
transference of income from a relatively rich man to a relatively poor man
takes place, it enables more intense wants to be satisfied at the expense of
(14)
less intense wants, and increases the aggregate sum of satisfaction.
If satisfaction of desire is the good, it follows that income redistribution
which increases the good (or the aggregate sum of satisfaction) is right,
and that we ought to carry out it.
(14) Pigou, A. C, ibid., p. 89.
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§ 6 The National Dividend and Labor s Real I皿come
Let's turn to the second and third questions presented in § 5. These
are the main subjects in Part IV of The Economics of Welfare.
Pigou says that we cannot investigate directly into how the national divi-
dend is distributed among the rich and the poor. He, therefore, proposes
to identify the poor with the wage-earners, and the earnings of
(15
wage-earners with the earnings of the factor labor. By doing so, we can
directly apply the familiar analysis of economics, while, according to
Pigou, no appreciable e汀or is introduced.
Now, we can change the above questions as follows :
2'Won't the cause, which increases the national dividend, decrease the
earnings of wAge-earners?
3　Won t the measure, which increases the earnings of wage-earners,
decrease the national dividend?
(1) Capital, Labor, and Invention
Pigou maintains that capital, labor, and invention are the most important
factors which affect the size of the national dividend {The Economics of
Welfare, Part IV, Chapter m and IV).
First, according to Pigou, an increase in the supply of capital means that
the supply of waiting, or of uncertainty-bearing, or of both, has been in-
creased, or that people have been willing to undertake more waiting for
(16
the fruits of labor and more exposure of those fruits to uncertainty.
Pigou's conclusions are: an increase in the supply of capital ①does in-
(is) Pigou, A. C. ibid., pp. 656-658.
(16) Pigou, A. C, ibid., p. 658.
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crease the size of the national dividend, andゥdoes not decrease the real in-
17)
come of wage-earners.
The second main factor is labor. When dealing with an increase in the
supply of labor, we must distinguish between ①an increase in the number
(18}
of workpeople, and ⑦a rise in their average capacity. When the number
of workpeople increases, ( i ) the national dividend increases, and ( ii )
the total real income of the working-class increases, but ( iii) the real in-
come per capita decreases. On the other hand when labors average
capacity rises, ( i ) the national dividend increases, and (五) the total
real income of the working-class increases, moreover (Hi) the real in-
come per capita increases.
Thirdly, we must deal with invention. Pigou divides inventions into
three types ; ①capital-saving inventions, ⑦labor-saving inventions, and
(19)
③neutral inventions. An invention which reduces the ratio of capital to
labor in the industry where it applies is a capitaトsaving invention, one
which increases it is a labor-saving invention, and one which leaves it un-
changed is a neutral invention.
As to inventions Pigou infers as follows : ①The majority of inventions
;:oi
have been labor-saving inventions, but,ゥbecause ( i ) the prices of the
goods principally purchased by the working-class have been reduced by
21
inventions, and (五) certain sorts of inventions, by giving a new field for
Hspending", may cause rich people to save less and so to provide less new
(17) Pigou, A. C, ibid., p. 662.
(is) Pigou, A. C, ibid., pp. 664-668.
(19) Pigou, A. C, ibid., p. 674.
Pigou, A. Cリibid., p. 675.
(2i) Pigou, A. C, ibid., pp. 676-677.
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(22)
capital, therefore, ③the great majority of inventions will increase the real
(23)
income of wage-earners as well as the aggregate national dividend.
* *　　　　　　　　　　*
I think that Pigou s inference as to inventions is wrong. If he stated
that the majority of inventions have be白n labor-saving inventions, he
ought to have concluded that inventions, after all, have been harmful to
the working-class. It was K. Marx who most exhaustively deployed the
argument that the majority of inventions have been labor-saving mven-
tions, and, therefore, inventions have been harmful to the working-
class. I can not accept both Pigou s and Marx s arguments. I think the
proposition that the majority of inventions have been labor-saving inven-
tions is false.
(2) Transference of Purchasing Power
Won t the cause, which increases the national dividend, decrease the ear-
nines of wage-earners? Pigou s answer is "no. Now, we must turn to
question　3': Won't the measure, which increases the earnings of
wage-earners, decrease the national dividend?
In order to raise the standard of living of wage-earners, we can use such
measures as the forcing-up of wage rate, subsidies to wages, bounties on
things purchased by wage-earners, transference of purchasing power to
wage-earners, and so on. Of these, transference of purchasing power to
wage-earners is probably the most important. We, therefore, take up
here only transference of purchasing power to wage-earners. When we
deal with the effect of it on the national dividend, we must investigate, at
(22) Pigou, A. C, ibid., pp. 678-679.
(23) Pigou, A. C, ibid., p. 680.
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least, three factors : ①the effect of taxation, ⑦idleness and thnftlessness,
andゥthe capacity of wage-earners.
First, in order to transfer purchasing power to wage-earners, we must
find a source of revenue. If the necessary funds are raised by means of
progressive income and inheritance taxes, the national dividend will con-
siderably diminish through the effect of ( i ) emigration of rich people,
(ii) the flight of capital to foreign countries, (iii) a decrease in the
amount of work done by rich people, and (iv) a decrease in the amount of
saving. (The Economics of Welfare, Part IV, Chapter BO
Secondly, it is likely that idleness and thriftlessness will spread among
the poor, if they expect relief from public funds. But the extent and in-
tensity of idleness and thriftlessness will vary as the way of transference of
purchasing power varies. (The Economics of Welfare, Part IV, Chapter X )
Thirdly, when the purchasing power transferred to wage-earners is ex-
pended on ( i ) training, (ii) care for the sick, and (iii) education, the
average capacity of wage-earners will rise, and the national dividend will
increase. (The Economics of Welfare, Part IV, Chapter X H )
HI The New Welfare Economics
§7 Law of Diminishing Marginal Utility and Income
Redistribution
Pigou says : ①there is a high probability that the national dividend will
diminish when transference of purchasing power to wage-earners is car-
ried out ( § 6) ;⑦but we ought to carry it out within a certain limit; ③
because the increase in real income of wage-earners causes an increase in
the economic welfare of a community ( § 5) I
The crux of Pigou's argument is 'law of diminishing marginal utility.
According to Robbins, the argument to justify income redistribution by
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dint of `law of diminishing marginal utility can be formulated as follows.
(Although Pigou and Robbins use the word `utility , we ought to interpret
it as the satisfaction of desire.)
1 The Law of Diminishing Marginal Utility implies that the more one has
of anything the less one values additional units thereof.
2　Therefore, it is said, the more real income one has, the less one values
additional units of income.
3　Therefore, the marginal utility of a rich man s income is less than the
marginal utility of a poor man s income.
4　Therefore, if transfers are made, and these transfers do not ap-
preciably affect production, total utility will be increased.
5　Therefore, such transfers are "economically justified.
Robbins criticizes the abovementioned argument. His criticism is
twofold.
First, Robbms points out that the third proposition "begs the great
metaphysical question of the scientific comparability of different in-
(25
dividual experiences.
When there are goods M and goods N on the market, whose prices are
equal, it is easy to determine which goods a person A prefers (or which
goods gives him more satisfaction of desire). You can ask him which
goods he prefers, or observe which goods he in fact selects. But we can
not get the answer likewise as to which is larger, `the satisfaction of
desires derived by a person A from an income of ¥ 10,000'or `the satisfac-
(24) Robbins, L. : An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science, Mac-
millan, London 1932, 2nd ed. 1935, p. 137.
(25) Robbins, L., ibid., p. 137.
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tion of desires derived by person B from an income of ¥10,000.' It is of
no use to ask them. A may answer, HThe satisfaction of desires which I
derive from an income of ・ 10,000 is larger than that which B derives from
an income of ¥10,000", whereas B may insists, HThe satisfaction of
desires which I derive from an income of ¥10,000 is larger than that
which A derives from an income of ¥10,000." According to Robbms,
there is no scientific way of deciding which insistense is true.
The second ciritcism Robbins makes concerning the argument justifying
income redistribution by dint of `law of diminishing marginal utility is as
important as the first, although most economists have paid little attention
to it. According to Robbins, if the four propositions from the first to the
fourth were scientifically legitimate, they would not allow us to directly
(26)
deduce the fifth proposition from them. Because the fact that the
transference of purchasing power from the rich to the poor causes the increase
in the total satisfaction of desires ofa community does not directly justify the
value judgement that such transference ought to be carried out. `The mcrea-
se in the satisfaction of desires of a community'does not prove `the
desirability of the increase in the satisfaction of desires.
HPropositions involving ought are on an entirely different plane from pro-
27)
positions involving is.
However, I adopted a tentative conclusion that satisfaction of desire is
the good [see, § 3 (2)]. Therefore, if the transference of purchasing
power from the rich to the poor causes the increase in the satisfaction of
desires of a community, I think such transference ought to be carried out.
Robbins, L., ibid., pp. 142-143.
(27) Robbins, L., ibid., pp. 142-143.
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§ 8　Hicks and the New Welfare Economics
Robbins's criticism of the argument to justify income redistribution by
dint of `law of diminishing marginal utility , especially the first part, leads
(28)
the economics of welfare to a new phase ; that is, the new welfare economics.
Its characteristics can be summarized as follows :
1 In the new welfare economics, the possibility of comparing the satisfac-
tions of desires derived by different individuals from a certain amount of
income is denied.
2　The new welfare economics begs the very problem of comparing the
satisfactions of desires derived by different individuals from a certain
amount of income.
Hicks exhorts to concentrate attention upon the case which is an excep-
tion to the general rule that the impossibility of inter-personal comparisons
(29)
prevents any estimation of the general efficiency of the economic system. And
he distinguishes ①the case in which a person can improve his position
without damaging the satisfactions of other l>eople from ⑦the case in which
an improvement in his position (an upward movement on his scale of
preferences) involves a downward movement for other people on their scales.
The latter cannot be estimated, because there is no scientific way of com-
paring the satisfactions of desires derived by different individuals from a
certain amount of income. But the former, Hicks says, does represent an
increase in economic welfare, or an increase in the efficiency of the system
Hicks, J.: The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 1939, in: Wealth and
Welfare Collected Essays on Economic Theory, Vol. I , Basil Blackwell, Ox-
ford 1981, pp. 61-62.
(29) Hicks, J., ibid., pp. 63-64.
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as a means of satisfying wants, from any point of view. He, then, defines
an optimum organization of the economic system as one in which eve町in-
dividual is as well off as he can be made, subject to the condition that no
(30
reorganization l・ermitted shall make any individual worse off.
§ 9 Feast a凪d Starvation
Imagine a community in which most people are starving, while a small
minority of the population are living luxurious lives. Then, a change of
the allocation of resources happens. Although the total quantity of wealth
increases, all the new wealth added to the community fall into the hands of
the rich. Now, the rich can provide each other with even more ex-
travagant feasts than before, but the masses are still starving as ever.
Can you call this new situation an optimum? According to the new
welfare economics, it is an optimum.
Marx maintains that although, under capitalism, the wealth of a com-
munity increases, almost all the wealth added to it fall into the hands of
(31
capitalists. According to Marx, this process is not only one of the
capitalistic evils, but also one of the factors which will cause the collapse of
capitalism.
If I were a Marxist, I would call the new welfare economics an
ideological pawn of capitalists attempting to justify unequal income
distributions.
Hicks, J., ibid., p. 64.
(3i) I think this conclusion of Marx is false. His conclusion is derived from the
false hypothesis that the majority of inventions have been labor-saving inven-
tions. [see, §6 (1)]
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IV Income Distribution, Market, a凪d Economic Policies
§ 10 The Masses Means or End?
Are the masses only a means which enables noble men to live noble
lives? Or, do the respective lives of the masses have their own intrinsic
values? If the lives of the masses are only a means to realize the noble
lives of noble men, we may be allowed to call the process assumed in § 9
(that is to say, the process in which almost all the new wealth added to a
community fall into the hands of the rich) an improvement of situation.
Although man may replace the rich with a king, aristocrat, hero and so on,
the coexistence of enriching the minority and starving the majority will, in
any case, be justified.
I reject the view that the masses are only a means to realize the noble
lives of noble men, and I insist that everybody has the right to enjoy his
own life. Although it is not easy to completely refute the view that the
masses are only a means, I will attempt to do so.
How can we cope with the view that the masses are a means? First, we
can refer to the reactions of those who are assigned the role of means.
They may not accept the assigned role. They may attempt a struggle
against the minority. If this happens, fear and hatred will spread among
the noble men, and their noble character will disappear. I hope many peo-
pie think it desirable to avoid the social system which assigns the majority
of population the role of means.
Secondly, we can appeal directly to the feelings of those who adovocate
assigning the majority the role of means. By letting them imagine the
misery of starving people, we can awaken their universal sympathies.
Most people have strong or weak sympathies for others, and they feel
unhappy when they see or hear others suffer. Many people cannot,
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therefore, torelate the state in which the majority of population are suffer-
ing at the nadir of unhappiness, while the small minority live noble and
graceful lives.
But, there might be those who are not disturbed at all by the abovemen-
tioned arguments. They might assert: the more violent the struggle
fought by the vulgar masses becomes, the more brightly the dignity of the
solitary noble man shines; the man who can relentlessly crush the
rebellion attempted by the vulgar masses must be the ruler ; those who are
disturbed by the suffering of petty beings have no right to become the
ruler.
A man, who is not disturbed at all by arguments and, moreover,
dedicates himself, as a means, to realize the noble lives of noble men, may
be called a fanatic.If there were such a fanatic, I wouldn t know how to
cope with him.
§ ll Suggestions Concerning Income Distribution and
Redistribution
If the view that the masses are only a means to realize the noble lives of
noble men is rejected, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to justify the
coexistence of `the extravagant feast enjoyed by the small minority of
population'and `the starving masses.
In this section, I will give some concrete suggestions concerning income
distribution.
(1) Income Distribution and Market Mechanism
Mostpeople would probably object to a very uneven distribution of com-
munity wealth (for example, while the greater part of the wealth falls into
the hands of the few, the majority of population are starving). And most
Utilitarianism & Welfare Economics41
people would probably think this kind of distribution ought to be chan-
ged. It is relatively easy to argue this point.
What kind of distribution, however, ought to be pursued, after a very
uneven distribution is improved? There are various arguments as to the
desirable distribution. I propose to let market mechanism determine
people s incomes. I think it undesirable to give a particular person or
organization the power to determine people's incomes.
Based on market mechanism people s incomes are determined in propor-
tion to how much they satisfy consumers'desires. Now we must ask if the
market is in the state in which the increasing wealth falls into the hands of
the few, while the standard oHiving of the masses is not improved at all.
We need not worry about this kind of phenomenon. Because, in
capitalistic countries whose allocation of resources are coordinated by
market mechanism, the standard of living of the masses has been raised.
(2) Three Conclusions
Today few people doubt that market mechanism is one of the most im-
portant causes for the high standard of living in the developed countries.
But, under market mechanism, those who cannot contribute to satisfy con-
sumers desires can get no income. How should we deal with those peo-
pie? I think we ought to help them.
On the other hand, there are a small number of people who accumulate
enormous wealth. How should we deal with them? I think we must not
forget the virtue of tolerance when we deal with the rich. It is likely that
a charge against the enormous wealth of the few, derives from envy.
Moreover, if we impose too high a tax on the rich, we must ourselves suf-
fer from a decrease in the national dividend[see, § 6 (2)].
I present three conclusions as to income distribution.
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1 We ought to let market mechanism determine people s incomes.
2 But we ought to help people whose income is insufficient to provide a
decent living. In other words, we ought to establish and maintain an in-
stitution of social security which includes health insurance, unemploy-
ment insurance, a pension scheme, public assistance and so on.
3 Although we may adopt a progressive income tax and a progressive in-
heritance tax, we must be careful not to let the degree of pr0-
gressiveness go too far.
§ 1 2 Justifiable?
All three conclusions in　§ ll (2) are my subjective judgements.
These judgements must be justified somehow or other. I will attempt
to justify my conclusions by means of the conjecture that most people in
the developed countries will agree with my conclusions.
Is it legitimate to resort to mostleople's agreement when we attempt to
justify a value judgement? I divide this question into two parts.
1 When all people agree with a value judgement, can all people s agree-
ment be a legitimate ground to justify that value judgement?
2　When, although most people agree with a value judgement, the few
disagree with it, how should we act?
(1) Cognition vs. Value Judgement
Let us assume that, in 1543 when Copernicus died, all people on the
earth had agreed with the hypothesis that the sun goes around the earth.
As far as cognition is concerned, it is obvious that we cannot use all
people's agreement to prove the hypothesis. On the other hand, if all
people on the earth had, then, believed in a view that monarchy is the best
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form of government, could all people's belief be a legitimate ground to
justify the view? I think it could be.
One of the characteristics of modern philosophy has been the inclina-
tion toward subjectivity, and this inclination has entailed relativism. In
this paper I have been dealing only with the relativism in the realm of
value. Relativism in the realm of cognition (or epistemology) is
another difficult problem which I cannot include in this paper.
Analytic philosophers in the 20th century have analyzed `the subjec-
tivity of value judgement.' Their analysis, I think, reached its peak
(32)
with R. M. Hare's The Language of Morals (1952). He uses the word
`prescriptivity'to describe the subjectivity of value judgement. But a
turn m thinking had already began at that point. I interpret Hare's
(33)　　　　　　　　(3d)
later works {Freedom and Reason, 1963 ; Moral Thiking, 1981) to be at-
tempts to salvage the cognition of the subjectivity of value judgement from
the morass of relativism.
Every value judgement is subjective. But, if everybody agrees as to
the most fundamental value judgement (s) , we can avoid the morass of
relativism. Therfore, I think that, when all people agree with a value
judgement, its agreement can be a legitimate ground to justify that
value judgement.
(2) Persuasion
When, although most people agree with a value judgement, the few
disagree with it, how should we act? Let us consider this problem, by
taking up unemployment insurance as an example.
Hare, R. M. : The Language of Morals, Clarendon Press. Oxford 1952.
Hare, R. M. : Freedom and Reason, Clarendon Press. Oxford 1963.
Hare, R. M. : Moral Thinking, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1981.
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Assume that a man objects to unemployment insurance, and that he
thinks that the unemployed must suffer, because his idleness caused his
unemployment. Those who adovocate establishing and maintaining
unemployment insurance should try to persuade him as follows : First,
idleness is not the only cause of unemployment, but rather depression
can cause unemployment. If a man, in spite of all his efforts, loses his
job because of depression, and if we reject establishing unemployment
insurance, are we just to him? Secondly, whether the rejection of
establishing unemployment insurance is just or not, will the neglect of
the suffering of the unemployed cause social unrest? If we wish to
avoid social unrest, we should pay attention to the problem of unemploy-
ment. Thirdly, we can appeal directly to the feelings of the opponent of
unemployment insurance. We may ask him, HSeeing, hearing, or lm-
agining the woes of the unemployed and his family, can you remain
calm?"
I hope that, after undergoing the abovementioned persuasion, all peo-
pie will agree to establish and maintain unemployment insurance.
*　　　*　　　*
When religion or nationalism comes under discussion, especially when
man is seized with religious or nationalistic fever, persuasion is probably
very difficult, nay, it seems to be impossible. However, those who not
only recognize 'the subjectivity of value judgement, 'but wish it does not
cause violence, must not give up. They must perseveringly continue
their persuasion in order to lead people to `an agreement as to the most
fundamental value judgement.
